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WALT DISNEY CO. v. POWELL: GOOD NEWS FOR THE
CHARACTER INFRINGER
I. INTRODUCTION
If he could read the opinion in Walt Disney Co. v. Powell' ("Dis-
ney"), the late Walt Disney would roll over in his grave. In awarding
statutory damages under the Copyright Act of 19762 ("1976 Act"), the
District of Columbia Circuit held that a copyrighted cartoon is not a
separate work if it contains a character in common with another cartoon
that is also the subject of an infringement action.3 The court's conclusion
does a disservice to both the cartoonist and the art form because it fails to
recognize that each cartoon is a separate and distinct artistic expression.4
The court apparently forgot that cartoon characters, unlike literary
characters, possess graphic qualities that are conjured up in the mind of
the creator and come to life when pen touches paper. The composition of
each cartoon, whether ultimately still-life or animated, involves a myriad
of variables of which the character's identity is merely a part.' The vari-
ables, including form, perspective, color, and movement, are formulated
and combined by the artist creating the end product.6 The mere fact that
two cartoons have characters in common does not automatically render
the remaining discretionary artistic elements void.
In order to fix the statutory damages award in the Disney case, the
District of Columbia Circuit had to determine how many works were
infringed.7 In making this determination, the court incorrectly applied
three tests by focusing on the common characters within each infringed
copyright rather than looking at each copyright as a whole. This Note
will analyze the application of the tests to the facts of the Disney case and
conclude that the court erred in awarding statutory damages for only
two works.
1. 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
3. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
4. Id.
5. For a discussion of the creative processes involved in producing still-life and animated
cartoons, see S. LEE & J. BUSCEMA, How TO DRAW COMICS THE MARVEL WAY (1978), and
F. THOMAS & 0. JOHNSTON, DISNEY ANIMATION, THE ILLUSION OF LIFE (1984).
6. Id.
7. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
The Walt Disney Company ("Walt Disney") brought an action
before the district court charging violations under the Copyright and
Lanham Trademark Acts8 by multiple defendants.9 The defendants were
charged with the unlicensed use of the popular cartoon characters
Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse.'0 All of the defendants settled, with
the exception of J & L Distributors" ("J & L"). J & L admitted liability,
but refused to acknowledge that Walt Disney was entitled to any relief.'2
Instead, J & L claimed that if Walt Disney had made its objections
known, J & L would have ceased production of the infringing articles
without the need for a lawsuit.'
3
J & L manufactured souvenir items that it sold from two ware-
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1988). "[T]he artistic rendition of
the cartoon character Mickey Mouse, once affixed to a product such as a T-shirt, is properly
protectable under the copyright laws. It is further protectable under the trademark laws since
the rendition serves as an indicator of source, origin, or sponsorship of the licensor of the T-
shirt, Walt Disney Productions." G. BATrERSBY & C. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISE
AND CHARACTER LICENSING, MERCHANDISING LAW AND PRACTICE, § 9.01 at 9-5 (1990).
The district court's only mention of the Lanham Act charges took the form of two sentences
within its discussion of remedies. First, after finding that the plaintiff was entitled to a statu-
tory damages award of $90,000, the court stated that "[d]efendant did not reproduce the phys-
ical mark, so he escapes the treble damage provision of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b)." Walt Disney Co.
v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1988). The district court's second reference to the
Lanham Act immediately preceeds its declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees
in the amount of $20,000. The court stated that "[i]n terms of the Lanham Act, this is an
exceptional case of willful infringement." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117 applied. Id. The Lanham Act charges were not discussed in the court of appeals'
opinion. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 provides in relevant part:
(a) When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office . . . shall have been established in any civil action arising
under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled ... to recover (1) defendant's
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action
.... If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is
either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgement for
such sum as the court shall find just, according to the circumstances of the case.
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1988).
(b) In assessing damages under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall ...
enter judgement for three times such profits or damages ... in the case of any
violation ... that consists of intentionally using a mark or designation, knowing
such mark or designation is a counterfeit mark . . . in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services. Id. § 1117(b) (1988).
9. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 1988).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12.
13. Id. The district court found this argument "wholly unacceptable." Walt Disney Co.
v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1988).
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houses to at least forty vendors in the Washington, D.C. area.' 4 These
vendors serviced the heavy tourist population in the nation's capital.' 5
The defendant's business was profitable, grossing more than one million
dollars a year. 6 Among the souvenir items J & L sold were T-shirts and
sweatshirts bearing designs and sayings including unlicensed reproduc-
tions of Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse in various poses. '
7
Walt Disney learned of J & L's unauthorized use of its cartoon char-
acters from a licensed retail establishment that was concerned that the
defendant's activities were hurting its own sales of authorized merchan-
dise.'8 Walt Disney subsequently launched a follow-up investigation on
the complaint. ' The testimony and reports produced at trial by Walt
Disney's investigator indicated that J & L was at all times aware that its
reproduction of the Walt Disney characters was unlawful.20 The investi-
gation further revealed that much of J & L's business was conducted in
cash.2' It was also discovered that J & L did not maintain standardized
business records and had no record of sales or profits,22 which renders
the task of fixing an award based upon actual damages and profits more
difficult.23
Walt Disney was harmed in several respects by J & L's actions.24
First, had J & L been an authorized manufacturer, Walt Disney would
have collected licensing fees for the use of its characters.2" Secondly, one
of the designs depicted the two characters clothed in Georgetown Uni-




18. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 1988).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Actual damages are commonly shown by a diminution in the value of the plaintiff's
copyrighted material. Diminution in value can be shown by demonstrating the sales lost to the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's infringement. One way to show lost sales is to produce
evidence of the defendant's sales of the infringed merchandise. But for the infringement, these
sales would have belonged to the plaintiff. Comment, Monetary Recovery Under the Copyright
Act, 65 OR. L. REV. 809, 810-12 (1986).
24. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1988).
25. Id. Licensing is big business. Sales of licensed products and licensing fees topped $62
billion dollars in 1989. Fitzgerald, Ad Age Gallup Survey, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 17, 1990,
at 3. The characters from "Sesame Street" alone gross $22 million per year in licensing fees.
Selling to Children, 55 CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1990, at 518. The "Charlie Brown" char-
acter in the popular comic strip "Peanuts" adorns 3,000 separate products, earning approxi-
mately $30 million annually for Charles Schultz, the "Peanuts" creator. Newcomb, The
Magic Kingdom, FORBES, Oct. 2, 1989, at 139. Licensing fees for "Rambo" products amount
to an astounding $300 million per year. Id.
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versity shirts.2 6 As the district court pointed out, this depiction gave the
impression that Walt Disney itself was an infringer since the university's
logos are also protected designs." Thus, J & L's actions led to Walt
Disney's loss of lucrative licensing fees and harm to Walt Disney's
reputation.28
J & L's illegal activity led to the copying of one of its infringed de-
signs by a printer J & L had hired to produce the shirts.29 Unbeknownst
to J & L, the printer manufactured and distributed its own shirts outside
the Washington, D.C. area, thereby increasing the harm to Walt Dis-
ney.30 The geographical extent of the harm may have been even greater,
since J & L did business with several printers outside Washington, D.C.
31
B. The District Court's Holding
The district court awarded statutory damages because of Walt Dis-
ney's inability to quantify the actual damages it suffered and to ascertain
J & L's profits. 32 The court found that there were six infringements, and
assessed damages at $15,000 per infringement for a total of $90,000.33
The court also awarded attorney's fees of $20,000 plus costs to be fixed
by the court clerk, and permanently enjoined J & L from using any of
Walt Disney's cartoon characters in the future.34
C. The Court of Appeals' Holding
The District of Columbia Circuit vacated the district court's calcu-
lation of the statutory damages award. 35 The court found that although
the Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse characters appeared in different
poses in the six infringed copyrights, each of the six copyrights did not
constitute a separate work for the purpose of determining the amount of
the award.36 Rather, the court held that there were only two works in-
fringed, namely the Mickey and Minnie characters, and remanded the
case to the district court for a redetermination of damages .
3





31. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1988).
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id.
35. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1990).




III. STATUTORY DAMAGES UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Copyright law has its origins in the Constitution of the United
States. The Constitution granted Congress the power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to au-
thors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. '"38 The exclusive rights of authors were secured by Congress
through statutorily created copyright protection.39
Protection afforded to the copyright proprietor "exist[s] automati-
cally from the moment of the author's creation of a work whose subject
matter is covered by the Copyright Act."'  The 1976 Act provides pro-
tection for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression."'" Subject to certain limitations,42 the author reserves the
rights to reproduce,43 prepare derivative works," distribute copies,45 and
publicly perform" or display4" the work.
Copyright law provides a mechanism for copyright owners to en-
force those rights against parties who seek to benefit from the author's
work without authorization. The copyright owner can bring suit for in-
fringement against a party who violates any of the owner's exclusive
rights.48 The 1976 Act provides several remedies against the infringer:
injunction; 49 impoundment and destruction of the infringing articles;5 0
actual damages plus the infringer's profits;5 1 statutory damages;5 2 and
attorney's fees and costs."
A. The Need for the Statutory Damages Remedy
In a 1961 report, the Register of Copyrights listed four reasons the
actual damages remedy alone is frequently inadequate to compensate the
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1988).
40. W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LATMAN'S]. Copyright registration is not a requirement for protection. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)
(1988).
41. Id. § 102(a) (1988).
42. Id. §§ 107-118 (1988).
43. Id. § 106(1) (1988).
44. Id § 106(2) (1988).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988).
46. Id. § 106(4) (1988).
47. Id § 106(5) (1988).
48. Id. § 501(b) (1988).
49. Id § 502 (1988).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
51. Id § 504(b) (1988).
52. Id. § 504(c) (1988).
53. Id § 505 (1988).
1991]
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owner for harm caused by infringement and to deter the potential in-
fringer.5 4 First, proof of harm, as in the Disney case, can be difficult or
impossible to quantify.55 Secondly, in cases such as a public performance
where the only harm is a lost license fee, the deterrent effect against the
potential infringer is minimal. 6 Thirdly, actual damages suffered by the
copyright owner may be less than the costs of the litigation." Finally,
profits of the infringer may be either nonexistent or impossible to
ascertain.
8
B. Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act of 1909
Under the Copyright Act of 1909 s9 ("1909 Act"), the court had dis-
cretion to decide whether it would award actual damages or statutory
damages when both profits and damages have actually been proven.6°
Where actual damages could not be proven, the court was required to
award statutory damages.61 The 1909 Act provided for an award of stat-
utory damages for each infringement.62
With the exception of a few specific categories of infringement,
which had their own minimum and maximum ranges,63 the 1909 Act
54. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE REGIS-
TER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 102




58. Id. at 103.
59. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976) (repealed 1978).
60. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir.
1966).
61. Id. at 241.
62. Section 101(b) of the 1909 Act provided in relevant part:
If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work.., such person shall be liable
... [to] pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor
may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as all the profits which the in-
fringer shall have made from such infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove every element of cost which he claims, or in lieu of actual
damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
63. Section 101(b) of the 1909 Act provided in relevant part:
[I]n the case of a newspaper reproduction of a copyrighted photograph, such dam-
ages shall not exceed the sum of $200 nor be less than the sum of $50, and in the case
of the infringement of an undramatized or nondramatic work by means of motion
pictures, where the infringer shall show that he was not aware that he was infringing,
and that such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen, such damages
shall not exceed the sum of $100; and in the case of an infringement of a copyrighted
dramatic or dramatico-musical work, by a maker of motion pictures and his agencies
for distribution thereof to exhibitors, where such infringer shows that he was not
aware that he was infringing a copyrighted work, and that such infringements could
not reasonably have been foreseen, the entire sum of such damages recoverable by the
[Vol. I11
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granted the court discretion to fix damages at a minimum of $250 and a
maximum of $5,000 for each infringement." The Supreme Court held
that "[w]ithin these limitations the court's discretion and sense of justice
are controlling, but it has no discretion when proceeding under this pro-
vision to go outside of them."65 The 1909 Act also provided discretion-
ary guidelines concerning the amount of damages to award when a
particular type of work was infringed.66 For example, the statute sug-
gested that a court award ten dollars for each infringing copy of a paint-
ing, statue, or sculpture.67
1. Difficulties in Applying the 1909 Act
A major difficulty facing the judiciary under the 1909 Act was deter-
mining exactly what constituted a single infringement and exactly what
warranted a separate award.6" Strictly interpreted, each unauthorized
copy, derivative work, distribution, performance or display is a separate
infringement.6 9 The courts struggled with this application, especially in
light of the technological advances since the 1909 Act was drafted. °
Furthermore, the 1909 Act's suggested awards for particular types of in-
fringement, which ranged from one dollar to fifty dollars per act or arti-
cle, would have no meaning if the $250 minimum were meant to be
applied in all cases to each infringing act or article.71 Difficult determi-
nations included an infringing play that was broadcast simultaneously
over 162 TV stations72 and nineteen separate radio broadcasts of the
same musical composition continued at monthly intervals.73
It was not surprising that the courts encountered difficulties in ap-
plying the 1909 Act to modern technology. After all, the statute "was
copyright proprietor from such infringing motion picture shall not exceed the sum of
$5,000 nor be less than $250. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
64. Id.
65. L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 101, 106-07 (1919).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978).
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 72-73 for examples of cases of difficult statutory damages determina-
tions faced by the courts under the 1909 Act.
69. Note, Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 LoY. U. CH. L.J. 487,
493-94 (1984).
70. Id. at 494 n.59.
71. Note, Statutory Damages for the Multiple Infringement of a Copyrighted Work: A Doc-
trine Whose Time Has Come, Again, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 463, 476 (1988).
72. Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The
court found that the 162-station telecast was a single infringement, and awarded $25,000 in
statutory damages. Id.
73. Baccaro v. Pisa, 252 F. Supp. 900, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court found that each
broadcast constituted a separate infringement and assessed $4,750 in statutory damages by
multiplying the 19 broadcasts by the $250 statutory minimum award. Id.
1991]
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enacted long before any Congressman ever heard of a nationwide tele-
cast."7 4 Decisions were often rendered based upon the "time" and "het-
erogeneity" tests." Application of the time test established that
infringements close in time were a single continuing infringement, while
those further apart in time were distinct and separate.76 The heterogene-
ity test looked at the "differences between the advertisers, financial ar-
rangements, locales, audiences, and other significant variables" to
determine whether a series of infringements constituted a single or multi-
ple infringement."
C. Statutory Damages Under the Copyright Act of 1976
Section 504 of the 1976 Act, unlike its predecessor, specifies that a
copyright owner can choose between actual damages and profits or statu-
tory damages.78 The owner can elect to receive statutory damages at any
time before the court renders its final judgement.79 The 1976 Act pro-
vides for an award of statutory damages "for all infringements involved
in the action, with respect to any one work."80 Application of this sec-
tion will in some cases require a precise definition of the word "work."
The 1976 Act does not define "work," and the limited case law which
addresses the issue involves facts dissimilar from those in Disney.81
74. Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
75. These tests were used to determine whether multiple reproductions, performances,
broadcasts, or exhibitions of a work constituted one or multiple infringements for the purpose
of fixing a statutory damages award. Iowa State University Research Fdn., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Note, supra note 69, at
496-97.
76. Iowa State University Research Fdn., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 475 F.
Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
77. Id.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988). This section provides:
Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect, at
any time before final judgement is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages
and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the ac-
tion, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is individually liable,
or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly or severally, in a sum of not
less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes of
this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one work.
79. Id
80. Id.
81. Two district court cases that did discuss the statutory damages award in terms of the
number of works infringed involve facts dissimilar to those in Disney. In Kepner-Tregoe, Inc.
v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124 (E.D. Mich. 1979), the defendants infringed two sets of training
seminar materials and a third set of materials designed to assist the seminar instructors. Id. at
127-28. Although the subject matter of the two seminars was the same, the seminars were
destined for two different audiences. Id. at 128. The court found that because the materials
designed for the two seminars had different objectives and were independently viable, they
were two separate works. Id. at 138. Since the instructors' materials would have no purpose
1991] COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
1. Flexibility in Setting the Award
One of the legislature's aims in revising the damages section for the
1976 Act was to provide the courts with leeway in setting the amount of
the award according to the particular circumstances of the case. 2 The
1976 Act omitted the 1909 Act's "suggested awards," which were based
on the type of article infringed.83 Instead, the 1976 Act gave the trial
court discretion in fixing the award within expanded statutory ranges."
In exercising that discretion, courts have considered various factors in-
cluding the attitude of the defendant, 5 the defendant's degree of inno-
cence,86 past incidents of infringement, 7 and unpaid license fees.88
Another aim of Section 504 was to provide clearer guidelines to the
judiciary in determining the size of the award.8 9 Today, the amount of
the statutory award can range from $500 to $20,000 for all infringements
of any one work.9 When the copyright owner is able to prove that the
without the seminar materials, the court concluded that they did not qualify as a separate
work. Id
The defendants in Cormack v. Sunshine Food Stores, 675 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich.
1987), infringed two questionnaires that the plaintiffs had designed to test the emotional status
and trustworthiness, respectively, of prospective employees. The court applied the viability
and Stigwood tests and held that the two questionnaires, which evaluated different characteris-
tics and had no questions in common, were separate works.
82. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5777 [hereinafter House Report].
83. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976) (repealed 1978) with 17 U.S.C. 504(c) (1988).
84. House Report, supra note 82, at 5778.
85. The court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Boston Trading Company, Inc., 230 U.S.P.Q.
137 (D.C.N.H. 1985), considered the "defendants' cavalier attitude" in establishing the dam-
ages award at a figure greater than the statutory minimum. Id. at 139. The court fixed the
award at $500 for each of nine infringed musical compositions. Id.
86. The defendant restaurant owner in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Coco's Development
Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. 714 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), publicly performed five musical compositions with-
out authorization. Id. at 714. The court found that the defendant was unaware that his ac-
tions constituted copyright infringement. Id. at 715. Therefore, the court fixed the award at
$150 for each of the five infringed songs. Id
87. In United Features Syndicate, Inc. v. Spree, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Mich.
1984), the defendant had been sued four times previously for copyright infringement. Id. at
1247. This time the defendant had reproduced the cartoon characters "Garfield" and "Odie"
on T-shirts. Id. at 1243. Taking the past infringements into consideration, the court awarded
$50,000 for each infringed character, for a total statutory damages award of $100,000. Id. at
1248.
88. The defendant in Morley Music Co. v. Dick Stacey's Plaza Motel, Inc., 725 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1983), publicly performed four ASCAP copyrighted musical compositions over a five-year
period without paying ASCAP license fees. Id. at 1-2. The fees for the period would have
totalled $4,500. Id. at 2. The court took this figure into consideration when fixing the statu-
tory damages award. Id. at 3-4. The court awarded $1,200 for each of the four songs for a
total of $4,800, plus costs and attorney's fees. Id. at 4.
89. House Report, supra note 82, at 5777.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988). The 1988 Amendment, which applies to all causes of
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infringement was willful, the maximum award is increased to $100,000.91
If the infringer can prove it was unaware that its actions constituted in-
fringement, the minimum award is reduced to $200.92 The logic in re-
ducing the minimum award in such cases is sound because the statute's
goal of deterring infringement is not implicated when an innocent in-
fringer is involved.93
2. The "One Award Per Work" Requirement
Section 504 directs a court to assess only one award when a single
work is infringed by a single infringer "no matter how many acts of in-
fringement are involved in the action and regardless of whether the acts
were separate, isolated, or occurred in a related series. "'4 Therefore, a
court will assess only one award even if the infringer produces many
infringing copies, conducts numerous public performances, displays the
work at various sites, or infringes more than one exclusive right, as long
as only one work is involved. 95
For the purposes of Section 504, all parts of a compilation and all
derivative works are considered a single work.96 Thus, a plaintiff will
action arising on or after March 1, 1989, increased the minimum and maximum limits from
$250 to $500 and $10,000 to $20,000 respectively. The former minimum and maximum levels
continue to apply to causes of action arising under the 1976 Act prior to March 1, 1989 (Janu-
ary 1, 1978 - April 30, 1989).
91. Id. § 504(c)(2) (1988). The 1988 Amendment increased the maximum award in cases
of willful infringement from $50,000 to $100,000. The area that falls between "innocent" and
"willful" infringement has been described as "a degree of fault based upon a negligent failure
to ascertain whether the product infringes a copyright, or a reckless disregard for whether
there is infringement." M.S.R. Imports v. Greenspan, 220 U.S.P.Q. 361, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
"Willful" is defined by the late copyright scholar Melville B. Nimmer as "with knowledge that
the defendant's conduct constitutes copyright infringement." 3 M. & D. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 14-04[B], at 14-40.3 and 40.4 (1990).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988). The 1988 Amendment increased the minimum award
for nonawareness cases from $100 to $200. Id
93. Comment, supra note 69, at 506.
94. House Report, supra note 82, at 5778.
95. Id. Thus, only one work is infringed when an infringer produces one million T-shirts
depicting Mickey Mouse in the same pose.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988). The statutory definitions of "compilation," "collective
work" and "derivative work" are as follows: A 'compilation' is a work formed by the collec-
tion and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship. The term 'compilation' includes collective works. Id. § 101 (1988) A 'collective
work' is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of
contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole. Id. A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works,
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, anno-
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receive only one award when both the original and the derivative works
are infringed.97 The same result will occur in the case of an infringed
compilation protected by copyrights in its entirety and its components.98
The establishment of one statutory award for all infringements of
any one work eliminated the need for a court to calculate the number of
infringements involved.9 9 However, another problem surfaced in its
place. Although a court under the 1976 Act need not concern itself with
the precise number of infringements in order to fix the statutory award, it
must instead determine the number of works infringed."co To make the
task even more difficult, the courts have found that the number of works
infringed does not always correspond to the number of copyrights in-
fringed, even where derivative works and compilations are not in-
volved.10' Therefore, lacking a statutory definition for "work," a court
in a difficult case will have to formulate a test to calculate the number of
works in the cause of action.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURTS
A. The District Court
Section 504 of the 1976 Act specifies that one statutory damages
award is to be made for "all infringements involved in the action, with
respect to any one work."102 Nowhere in its opinion did the district
court use the word work in the context of damages. '0 3 Instead, the court
referred to six infringements that were proven, and stated that "[i]t is
unnecessary to consider the precise application of the copyright to each
:. ... 1' The court concluded its discussion of damages by stating that
"[t]hese violations are not overlapping," and thus awarded $15,000 for
each of the six "violation[s]." 10 5
tations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of
authorship, is a 'derivative work.' Id. § 101.
97. Id. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
98. Id.
99. Comment, supra note 23, at 827.
100. Since Section 504 of the 1976 Act mandates one award for all infringements of any one
work, the necessary starting point is a determination of the number of works infringed.
101. See supra note 81 for a discussion of two cases where courts held that the number of
works did not correspond to the number of infringed copyrights. Neither case involved deriva-
tive works or compilations.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
103. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1988).
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id
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B. The Court of Appeals
The Disney court laid out tests from three separate sources, appar-
ently to apply them to the facts of this case in order to determine the
number of works infringed."° The tests required three separate but
closely-related inquiries."0 7 The first inquiry was whether each of the
Disney copyrights could "live its own copyright life. '" ' Next, the court
asked whether the copyrights have "separate economic value."'" The
final inquiry was whether the copyrights are "viable" when separated
from each other. 011
1. The Stigwood Own Copyright Life Test
First, the court cited the Second Circuit case of Robert Stigwood
Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly... ("Stigwood"), which was decided under the
1909 Act. The Stigwood court therefore properly calculated the statutory
damages awards based upon the number of infringements, rather than
the number of works infringed." 2 Although Stigwood does not provide a
definition of work per se, the test that it developed to refine its infringe-
ment calculation is nevertheless useful in determining the number of
works under the 1976 Act. The Stigwood court held that where a single
performance infringed "overlapping copyrights on substantial parts of
the entire work" that could not singularly "live their own copyright life,"
the performance shall be considered a single infringement for the purpose
of determining the amount of statutory damages.' 13
Stigwood consolidated on appeal two lower court cases charging
copyright infringement of the rock operas "Jesus Christ Superstar"
("Superstar") and "Tommy."' 14 Stigwood Group and Track Music,
owners of multiple copyrights in "Superstar" and "Tommy" respec-
tively, brought suit for infringement under the 1909 Act.115 The defend-
106. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 130-56 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
111. 530 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1976).
112. Id. at 1104-05.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1097. The joint "Superstar" plaintiffs were The Robert Stigwood Group Lim-
ited, Leeds Music Limited, and Leeds Music Corporation [hereinafter collectively referred to
as "Stigwood Group"]. Id. The joint "Tommy" plaintiffs were Track Music, Ltd., Fabulous
Music Ltd., and New Ikon, Ltd. [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Track Music"]. Rob-
ert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1098 (2d Cir. 1976).
115. Stigwood was decided in 1976. The effective date of the 1976 Act was January 1, 1978.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
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ants, identical in both cases, were Roman Catholic priests who publicly
performed the two operas on numerous occasions without
authorization. 1
16
In the case of the "Superstar" opera, which was protected by six
separate copyrights, the lower court found that thirty-eight infringing
performances of the work had occurred.17 The court awarded $22,800
in statutory damages without explaining how it arrived at this amount. 1 18
Stigwood Group appealed the decision, contending that the trial court
should have multiplied the number of copyrights in the opera by the
number of performances, and then multiplied that figure by the statutory
minimum award to arrive at the total award.119 Stigwood Group also
asserted that the court underrepresented the number of infringing
performances. 
1 20
On appeal, the Stigwood court agreed with Stigwood Group that the
lower court should have adhered to the statutory minimum, found that
the priests had conducted forty-eight infringing performances, and ex-
amined the relationship between the six copyrights before calculating the
damage award. 121  The Stigwood court noted that the copyrights in
"Superstar" consisted of three song copyrights and three copyrights en-
compassing the entire work. 122 The court viewed the latter three, two
copyrights in the libretto1 23 and one in the vocal score, as "superfluous
protective layers" that merited only one statutory damage award. 1 24 The
Stigwood court found that the three song copyrights, however, could
"live their own copyright life" and as such warranted their own
awards. 125 Therefore, the proper damage calculation consisted of multi-
plying four copyrights by forty-eight infringing performances, and multi-
plying that figure by the then existing $250 statutory minimum, to arrive
at a total award of $48,000.126
The "Tommy" case was more straight forward since it did not in-
116. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1097 (2d Cir. 1976).
117. Id. at 1098.
118. Id. at 1099. The Stigwood court surmised that the lower court had arrived at the figure
"by multiplying 38 performances by six copyrights infringed ... for a total of 228 infringe-
ments, and awarding $100 for each violation." Id. at 1099 n.8.
119. Id. at 1099.
120. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1099 (2d Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 1103-04.
122. Id. at 1104.
123. "Libretto" is defined as "the text of a work (as in an opera) for the musical theater."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 668 (9th ed. 1984).
124. Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1104 (2d Cir. 1976).
125. Id. at 1105.
126. Id
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volve overlapping copyrights. 127 Track Music contended that its twenty-
six song copyrights and one copyright on the work as a whole were in-
fringed during two unauthorized public performances.128 Pursuant to its
"Superstar" reasoning, the Stigwood court held that the appropriate
damage award was determined by multiplying twenty-seven copyrights
by two performances, which was then multiplied by the statutory mini-
mum resulting in a judgement of $13,500.129
2. The Peri Separate Economic Value Test
The second source the Disney court looked at in its quest to define
work was the separate economic value test in RSO Records, Inc. v.
Peri 130 ("Peri "). Like the Stigwood test, the test in Peri looks at the rela-
tionship between the infringed copyrights. 131 The Peri test established
that the subject of a copyright is not a separate work if it has no eco-
nomic value when separated from another copyright in the suit.
132
The joint plaintiffs in Peri were producers, manufacturers, and dis-
tributors of sound recordings. 13 3 The suit was prompted by a Federal
Bureau of Investigation probe into the counterfeit recording business.134
The multiple defendants 135 manufactured records, tapes, and color sepa-
rations1 36 used in the production of record and tape packaging
materials. 137
One issue in Peri was whether the production of color separations by
Dynasty Graphics, Incorporated ("Dynasty") constituted an act of in-
fringement since "color separations are not exact reproductions of copy-
righted graphics." 138  The court reasoned that because the color
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1098.
129. Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976).
130. 596 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
131. Id. at 862 n.16.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 851. The joint Peri plaintiffs were RSO Records, Inc., MCA Records, Inc.,
Warner Brothers Records, Inc., RCA Corporation, CBS Inc., Casablanca Records &
Filmworks, Inc., and Elektra/Asylum/Nonesuch Records, a division of Warner Communica-
tions, Inc. [hereinafter collectively referred to as "RSO Records"]. Id. at 849.
134. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
135. The corporate defendants in Peri were Creative Disc, Inc. and Dynasty Graphics, Inc.
Defendants Joseph Peri and Carl Fueuerstein were in charge of operations at Creative and
Dynasty. Defendant Salvatore Peri was employed at a tape duplicating facility. Id. at 851-52.
Defendants will hereinafter be collectively referred to as "Creative."
136. A color separation is created by photographing original artwork and producing sepa-
rate photographic reproductions in each of four colors. The packaging manufacturer then uses





separation process is a necessary step in producing counterfeit graphics
and has no value otherwise, the producer of the color separations is held
liable as a contributory infringer with respect to the reproduction of the
original graphics. 13 9 Furthermore, the court held that even if the color
separations were not intended for Dynasty's own use, Dynasty was still
liable for contributory infringement as long as it was aware of the ulti-
mate use of its creative endeavors." 4 Thus, the court found that Dy-
nasty was contributorily liable for infringing the packaging graphics in
the sound recordings.14
RSO Records' case included testimony by undercover Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation agents and other witnesses and the admission into
evidence of Creative's business records seized by the agency. ' 42 The busi-
ness records revealed that Creative produced as many as 1.8 million
records during a particular fifteen-month period and 3,000 to 4,000 tapes
each day. 1 43 The Bureau also found two of the record companies' phono-
graph records, presumably manufactured by Creative, and direct evi-
dence that one tape was copied.'"
The court found for RSO Records on the issue of liability145 and
turned to the issue of damages. RSO Records did not express a prefer-
ence for either actual damages or statutory damages, but instead asked
the court to grant whichever would result in the larger award.146 The
court assessed the actual damages at $42,239.85. '
4
1
In calculating the statutory award, the court had to determine if
packaging graphics and the sound recordings they encased were separate
works. 48 As the court noted, the volume of sales to the public of coun-
terfeit recordings is directly dependent upon packaging that appears to
be genuine.' 49 The court concluded that "[i]nasmuch as graphics simply
complement the recording and have no separate economic value,
whatever their artistic value, they must be considered part of the musical
'work' . .. ., Thus, the Peri court established its test to determine
139. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
140. Id at 858.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 855-56.
143. Id at 856.
144. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
145. Id. at 858-60.
146. Id. at 860.
147. Id. at 861.
148. Id. at 862 n.16.
149. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
150. Id. at 862 n. 16 (emphasis added).
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what constitutes a work.' 51
The statutory damages were set at $50,000 for each of two phono-
graph records, one tape, and twenty-six color separations.' 52 As part of a
musical work, each of the twenty-six color separations merited its own
award since the infringement of the particular recording it belonged to
was not part of the cause of action.' 53 Had Creative also infringed the
twenty-six recordings, the statutory award would not have been in-
creased.' 54 The court said that the twenty-seventh color separation did
not warrant a separate award since the packaging it was destined for was
that of the aforementioned infringed tape, which already received the
maximum award.' 55 Thus calculated, the court fixed the statutory dam-
ages award at $1,450,000, more than thirty-four times greater than the
actual damages figure.' 56
3. The Nimmer Viability Test
The third source the Disney court looked at to determine a definition
for "work" was Nimmer on Copyright "" ("Nimmer"). The relevant pas-
sage in the treatise begins with a discussion of the Stigwood overlapping
copyrights/own copyright life doctrine, with which Nimmer neither
agrees nor disagrees.' Nimmer concludes the discussion with what is
essentially an interpretation of Stigwood. "9 According to Nimmer, the
Stigwood doctrine means that "the subject of a separate copyright would
have to be in itself musically, dramatically, or otherwise viable even if not
presented in conjunction with the other work in which it is incorporated"
in order to qualify as a separate work.' 6°
4. The Court of Appeals Applies the Tests
The court of appeals' conclusory analysis was comprised of three
sentences.16 ' Instead of applying the tests to each copyrighted cartoon
and drawing as a whole, the court applied the tests to the characters
151. Id.
152. Id. at 863.
153. Both the graphics and the recording are considered the same musical work, and plain-
tiffs "may not recover multiple statutory awards where they have copyrighted both graphics
for a recording and the recording itself." Id. at 862 n.16.
154. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
155. Id. at 863.
156. Id.
157. M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1990) [hereinafter NIMMER].
158. NIMMER, supra note 157, § 14.04[E] at 14-40.13.
159. Id. at 14-40.13 and 14-40.14.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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within each cartoon and drawing.'62 This approach, which ignores the
remaining artistic elements protected by each copyright, took the follow-
ing form:
While Mickey and Minnie are certainly distinct, viable works
with separate economic value and copyright lives of their own,
we cannot say the same is true for all six of the Disney copy-
rights of Mickey and Minnie in various poses which the district
court found to be infringed in this case. Mickey is still Mickey
whether he is smiling or frowning, running or walking, waving
his left hand or his right. Thus, we find that [defendant's]
mouse-face shirts infringed only two of Disney's works.'
63
In a footnote following its brief analysis, the court observed that two
of the copyrights Walt Disney claimed were infringed depict Mickey and
Minnie in scenes from the animated cartoon "Steamboat Willie." ' " The
court reasoned that even though "Steamboat Willie" as a whole is a dis-
tinct and economically viable work, 65 reproduction of a single scene in-
fringes only the characters, in this case Mickey and Minnie.'66
V. ANALYSIS
A. Graphic Character Protection
The issue of copyright protection for graphic characters came before
the Ninth Circuit in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates ' 67 ("Air Pi-
rates"). The defendants in Air Pirates published two magazines without
authorization containing the likenesses of at least twenty-one Disney
characters. 168 The characters were portrayed as "active members of a
free-thinking, promiscuous, drug-ingesting counterculture."' 69  The
court established that a comic book character, unlike a literary character,
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 570 n.10. "Everyone knows that it was 'Steamboat Willie' and Mickey Mouse
that put Walt Disney on the map." L. MALTIN, THE DISNEY FILMs 291 (1984). "Steamboat
Willie," released in 1928, was Disney's third Mickey Mouse cartoon. Inspired by the "Jazz
Singer," which led to the end of silent motion pictures two years later, "Steamboat Willie" was
the first cartoon with a synchronized soundtrack and featured Walt Disney himself as the
voice of Mickey Mouse. Id. at 4. "Steamboat Willie's" success prompted Disney to remake
with sound two silent Mickey Mouse cartoons it had previously completed, "Plane Crazy" and
"Gallopin' Gaucho." Id. at 308.
165. Thus, "Steamboat Willie" would pass the Peri test.
166. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
167. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
168. Id. at 753 n.5.
169. Id at 753 (quoting Comment, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F.
L. REv. 564, 582 (1976)).
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is copyrightable because it has "physical as well as conceptual quali-
ties." 7° The addition of physical characteristics renders a character
"more likely to contain some unique elements of expression.''. As a
result, the Air Pirates court asserted that "it is plain that copying a comic
book character's graphic image constitutes copying to an extent sufficient
to justify a finding of infringement."' 72
Following the Air Pirates decision, the prevailing view was that
graphic characters are entitled to copyright protection per se.' 7 3 A char-
acter itself, however, is not the subject of a separate copyright. 74 In-
stead, the character receives protection as part of the work in which it is
embodied. '"
B. The Six Copyrights
Disney claimed that six individual copyrights were infringed by J &
L's actions.' 76 Neither the district court nor the court of appeals pro-
vides a clear description of each copyright or the form their infringement
took on J & L's shirts. From the district court's opinion we know that
one of the garments featured Mickey and Minnie clothed in Georgetown
University shirts, 177 and another portrayed the two mice as "black
skinned,"' 7' apparently neither of which was a design original to Disney.
The court of appeals states that two of the infringed copyrights "por-
trayed Mickey and Minnie in poses used in the movie 'Steamboat
Willie.' ,,171
Based upon the limited information the courts have provided and
the inferences which can be drawn therefrom, certain assumptions must
be made for this analysis. The author will assume that the depictions of
Mickey and Minnie in the Georgetown University shirts and as black
skinned were not original to Disney. In those two scenes alone, all crea-
tive elements other than the characters themselves were contributed by J
&L.
170. Id. at 755.
171. Id.
172. Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1978).
173. NIMMER, supra note 157, § 2.12 at 2-171.
174. "The copyright law does not provide for the copyright registration of characters as
such. However, original works of authorship describing, depicting, or embodying a character
are registrable if otherwise in order." Latman's, supra note 40, at 47 n.132 quoting Compen-
dium II of Copyright Office Practices § 202.02(1).
175. Id.
176. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
177. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1988).
178. Id.
179. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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The author will also assume that the two copyrighted "Steamboat
Willie" scenes were reproduced in a substantially similar 80 fashion onto
two separate T-shirts and that at least one other infringing garment bore
a substantially similar reproduction of Mickey as he appeared in a sepa-
rate copyrighted still-life drawing. Both the "Steamboat Willie" scenes,
originally part of the animated cartoon, and the one or more still-life
drawings that appeared on J & L's shirts depicted Mickey and Minnie in
poses and settings created by Walt Disney. The assumption that some of
the shirts were imprinted with exact reproductions is supported by lan-
guage in the district court opinion, which asserts that the "copyrights in
Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse will be enforced as to exact copies and
variations."'
C. The District Court Ignored the Call of the Statute
Given the clear directive of Section 504, the district court's failure to
address the issue of statutory damages in terms of the number of works
infringed is more than an oversight.'8 2 Application of this section re-
quires a court to first determine the number of works involved in the suit
before calculating the statutory award.8 3 That figure is arrived at with-
out regard to the number of times each work is infringed."8 4 Since the
district court awarded $15,000 for each of six infringements, and did not
discuss the number of works it found to be infringed, i8 5 it is unclear
whether the court properly applied the law.
D. The Court of Appeals Applied the Tests Incorrectly
The court of appeals recognized the mistake of the district court in
calculating the statutory damages award based upon the number of in-
fringements.'8 6 After starting off on the right track, the reasoning of the
court of appeals goes astray. After incorrectly applying the tests to de-
termine the number of works infringed, the court erroneously concludes
that only two works were infringed.
180. In a copyright infringement suit, a showing of substantial similarity is a necessary
element to prove copying, which in turn is necessary to prove infringement.
181. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1988) (emphasis added).
182. Courts have ignored the statutory command of the 1976 Act to assess one damage
award for all infringements of any one work in several cases including Milene Music, Inc. v.
Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (D.R.I. 1982), where the court awarded $625 for each time
a song was publicly performed without authorization. Id
183. See supra note 100.
184. House Report, supra note 82, at 5778.
185. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1988).
186. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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1. The Stigwood Test Properly Applied
The Stigwood test18 7 examines whether the individual copyrights in
a cause of action overlap.' Overlapping copyrights protect subject mat-
ter designed to be used with other copyrighted material. I 9 According to
Stigwood, overlapping copyrights cannot singularly live their own copy-
right lives because they are not whole and complete without each
other."9 Therefore, the subject of each overlapping copyright does not
qualify as a separate work.
A copyright in one cartoon does not overlap a copyright in another
cartoon merely because one or more of the same characters appears in
both cartoons. Again, this view ignores the creative elements in a car-
toon that are separate from the character itself. A copyright which pro-
tects Mickey in a particular pose, against a particular background,
engaged in a particular activity, does not overlap a copyright in a second
cartoon portraying Mickey in a different pose, against a different back-
ground, and engaged in a different activity. 9' The two copyrights pro-
tect separate and distinct subject matter that was created to be used
independently.
In Stigwood, the copyrights found to be overlapping and superfluous
covered portions of an opera from beginning to end.' 92 The case of one
copyright in each of two separate cartoons is clearly distinguishable from
two copyrights protecting one opera. By looking at the characters within
the cartoon and not at the cartoon as a whole, the Disney court failed to
see the distinction.
187. See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text.
188. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1104 (2d Cir. 1976).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Further support for the proposition that different poses of the same cartoon character
constitute more than one work for purposes of fixing statutory damages is found in two Florida
district court cases. Neither case, however, discussed the award in terms of the number of
works involved. United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Rheingold, 209 U.S.P.Q. 317 (S.D. Fla.
1979), involved the sale of unauthorized iron-on transfers containing the likenesses of "Pea-
nuts" cartoon characters. Id. at 318. One of the heat transfers depicted the character Snoopy
as he normally appears and the other displayed Snoopy in his "Joe Cool" pose. Id. Although
it did not discuss the statutory damages award in terms of the number of works infringed, the
court nonetheless awarded $8,000 in statutory damages for each of the infringing transfers. Id
In United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co., 569 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D. Fla.
1983), the court fixed separate damage awards for infringing plaster molds of Snoopy as he
normally appears, and Snoopy in his "World War I Flying Ace" garb. Id. at 1480-81. A third
award was made for a mold of a dog named "Fred" that was found to be substantially similar
to Snoopy himself. Id.
192. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1104 (2d Cir. 1976).
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2. The Peri Test Properly Applied
The Peri test asks whether each infringed copyright has separate
economic value.193 If the answer is yes, then the subject matter of the
copyright is a separate work for the purpose of awarding statutory dam-
ages.' 94 The Peri court determined that graphics created expressly to
adorn record album covers do not have separate economic value in-
dependent from the recordings themselves, and therefore are not separate
works. 19' This conclusion is based upon the fact that the sole purpose for
the purely utilitarian packaging is to house the recordings.' 96 The pack-
aging's appearance in the marketplace is strictly dependent upon the
existence of its contents. While it is highly likely that the public would
purchase the recordings without the packaging, the converse is highly
unlikely.
The symbiotic relationship between a sound recording and its pack-
aging is distinguishable from two separate depictions of the same cartoon
character. The economic value of one cartoon is not entangled with the
existence of the second cartoon, except to the extent that the popularity
of the first release may fuel the popularity of subsequent releases. Each
would be in the marketplace even if the other did not exist. Therefore,
both have separate economic value, from which it follows that both are
separate works.
In asserting that the copyrighted depictions of Mickey and Minnie
Mouse in various poses do not have separate economic value, the court is
ignoring the value to Walt Disney. Walt Disney itself could reproduce
the infringed scenes onto its own merchandise or collect licensing fees for
the privilege. A Mickey Mouse fan is likely to buy several shirts portray-
ing the venerable mouse in different poses or in scenes from different
cartoons. Ultimately, defendant J & L would not have imprinted the
designs on its shirts if they had no value, which presumably they did,
judging from the volume of J & L's sales. 19' Since J & L stole and prof-
ited by using the designs, this proof shows that even a solitary scene from
"Steamboat Willie" has its own economic value.
3. The Nimmer Test Properly Applied
The Nimmer viability test is merely an interpretation of the Stig-
193. See supra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
194. RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
195. Id. at 863.
196. Id. at 862 n.16.
197. The district court found that J & L's yearly sales volume resulted in gross receipts of
over one million dollars. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D.D.C. 1988).
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wood test. 98 In applying both the Stigwood and Nimmer tests, the court
erred by focusing on the common characters in the cartoons instead of
focusing on each cartoon as a whole. When properly applied to the facts
of this case, most of the separately copyrighted cartoons and drawings
are found to be distinct and viable works. Therefore, each warranted its
own statutory damages award.
4. The "Steamboat Willie" Infringement
The Disney court's emphasis on the characters in the cartoons is
especially difficult to follow when this line of reasoning leads to the ulti-
mate conclusion that a full length cartoon is not a separate work.' 99 Un-
like Air Pirates, the Disney case does not merely involve taking the
likenesses of characters and putting them in situations conjured up by
unauthorized users.2"° More than just the character was taken in Disney.
Included among J & L's infringing actions was the duplication of exact
poses created by Walt Disney's "Steamboat Willie" animators.2 °"
The production of an animated cartoon involves highly technical
and creative processes.2 °2 Once a cartoon script is finalized, the anima-
tors take over. The animators break down the action in every scene into
a series of drawings, each depicting the characters at a slightly different
point in time. 2 3 The illusion of live action is created when the drawings
are photographed consecutively and projected at the rate of twenty-four
frames per second. 2' Thus, a ten-minute Walt Disney cartoon includes
as many as 14,400 scenes that could be appropriated to adorn a T-
shirt.2 o5
As discussed previously, the solitary "Steamboat Willie" scenes
clearly have separate economic value. Aside from the separate economic
value test, reproducing a scene from "Steamboat Willie," or from any
198. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
199. The court did acknowledge that "Steamboat Willie" is a separate work, but only when
more of its elements other than just Mickey and Minnie Mouse are infringed. Walt Disney Co.
v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 570 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1990). How much more the court would require
is unclear.
200. As discussed earlier, for the purposes of this analysis it will be assumed that J & L's
shirts included exact reproductions of Disney's cartoons. See supra text accompanying notes
180 and 181.
201. Id.
202. For a discussion of the animation process, see F. THOMAS & 0. JOHNSTON, DISNEY
ANIMATION, THE ILLUSION OF LIFE (1984).
203. Id.
204. L. MALTIN, supra note 164, at 4.




other cartoon for that matter, is as much an unlawful reproduction as is
duplication of the entire cartoon. Therefore, once the court acknowl-
edged that "Steamboat Willie" was, as a whole, a separate and distinct
work that had been infringed, the court should have gone no further.
Instead, the court's reasoning requires that a line be drawn somewhere
between the reproduction of a single frame and reproduction of the entire
film.
Section 106 of the 1976 Act, which lists the exclusive rights reserved
to the copyright owner, makes no reference to the percentage of a work
that must be copied in order to constitute an infringing reproduction. 2 6
Reference to the extent of copying that is forbidden appears only in Sec-
tion 107, which delineates the factors to consider in determining if an
accused infringer's actions constitute fair use.2 °7
Fair use is an unauthorized, yet non-infringing, use of a copy-
right. 20 ' Fair use includes use by reproduction for criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research.2t 9 One of the statu-
tory criteria to be considered in determining fair use is "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole."' 210 If the legislators intended to qualify the exclusive reproduc-
tion rights of the copyright owner in similar terms for purposes other
than fair use, they would have done so. With the possible exception of
fair use, nowhere is it written that reproduction of less than the entire
work will not constitute infringement. Therefore, since "Steamboat Wil-
lie," acknowledged by the Disney court to be a separate and distinct
work, has been infringed, the infringement of this separate and distinct
work merits its own award of statutory damages on this basis alone.
E. The Number of Works Properly Calculated
The tests that the District of Columbia Circuit applied to determine
the number of works infringed are logical and useful tests. Unfortu-
nately, the court applied the tests incorrectly in Disney. The court erred
in focusing on the characters in the infringed cartoons and drawings,
concluding that in all cases they were the only elements that were truly
206. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
207. Id. § 107 (1988).
208. The traditional definition of fair use is "a privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent."
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H.
BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT & LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). No one would argue that J & L's purely self-serving commer-
cial use of the Disney characters is a fair use.
210. Id. § 107(3) (1988).
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
infringed. Had the court properly focused on each cartoon or drawing as
a whole, it would have held that J & L infringed more than two works.
The court should have assessed one statutory award for each of
Walt Disney's copyrighted drawings that were not part of an animated
cartoon. The court also should have assessed one statutory award for the
infringement of "Steamboat Willie" after finding that it was a separate
and distinct work. Although J & L misappropriated two separately
copyrighted scenes from "Steamboat Willie," their infringement war-
ranted only one award based upon the 1976 Act's requirement that all
parts of a compilation are to be considered a single work.2 1" ' Arguably,
an animated cartoon qualifies as a compilation because it is composed of
1,440 separately drawn scenes per minute of running time.212
The court need not assess a separate statutory award for the scenes
depicting Mickey and Minnie in Georgetown University shirts and as
black skinned. These two designs were not exact reproductions of draw-
ings or cartoons copyrighted by Disney.2"' Instead, J & L placed Mickey
and Minnie in poses and settings created by J & L.2'" A separate award
is not warranted under the Copyright Act since, with respect to these
two designs, the court was correct in stating that the only elements in-
fringed were the two characters. The infringement of the Mickey and
Minnie works has already been compensated for by virtue of their inclu-
sion in the copyrighted drawings and in "Steamboat Willie," each of
which should have received its own statutory award.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the 1976 Act, when the number of works is under-
represented, the statutory award will be less than the Act requires. Since
the statutory damages provision requires an award for all infringements
with regard to any one work, the fewer works a court finds, the lower the
total award will be. The implication of Disney is that the force of the
twin aims of the statutory damages section, compensation for harm
caused to the copyright owner and deterrence of the potential in-
fringer,215 will be diluted. As long as the sum of money to be made is
greater than the price to be paid if caught, the infringer is not as likely to
be deterred by the threat of statutory damages. A savvy infringer, upon
reading this case, will confine an unauthorized reproduction to a few
211. Id. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
212. See supra note 96 for the statutory definition of compilation.
213. See supra note 200.
214. See supra note 200.
215. 1961 REPORT, supra note 54, at 103.
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highly popular cartoon characters. To maximize its profits, the infringer
will reproduce those characters in as many forms and on as many articles
as the market will bear, and of course will not keep any records of sales
or profits.
The lower the total statutory award, the less likely a plaintiff will be
adequately compensated in cases where actual damages are difficult or
impossible to measure. Intangible property loss, such as diminution in
market value and lost sales, will always be difficult to demonstrate by the
copyright owner. 216 Disney is especially disheartening to the owners of
copyrights in cartoons and other graphic depictions of characters within
the District of Columbia Circuit where this case is binding authority.
Since unauthorized reproduction of cartoon characters is apparently very
lucrative, grossing over one million dollars a year for the Disney defend-
ant alone,217 the practice is not likely to stop soon. We can only hope
that the court recognizes its mistake before it imposes an inadequate
measure of liability on another character infringer.
Judy D. Vaccaro
216. Note, supra note 71, at 489.
217. See supra note 197.
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